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Comment
Enforcing Antenuptial Contracts in Minnesota: A
Practice in Search of a Policy Basis in the
Wake of McKee-Johnson v. Johnson
William F. Fraatz
Lance Johnson, an attorney, and Mary McKee, a nursing
education administrator, married on June 14, 1980.1 Both had
been divorced and had children from their previous marriages.
Two days before their wedding they executed an antenuptial
contract purporting to set forth their rights in their non-marital
and marital property.2 Minnesota's antenuptial contract stat-
ute,3 enacted in 1979, governed their agreement.4
1. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1989) (en
banc).
2. Id at 261-63.
3. Minn. Stat. § 519.11 (1990). The statute provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. A man and woman of legal age may enter into an ante-
nuptial contract or settlement prior to solemnization of marriage
which shall be valid and enforceable if (a) there is a full and fair dis-
closure of the earnings and property of each party, and (b) the parties
have had an opportunity to consult with legal counsel of their own
choice. An antenuptial contract or settlement made in conformity
with this section may determine what rights each party has in the
nomnarital property, defined in section 518.54, subdivision 5, clauses
(a) to (d), upon dissolution of marriage, legal separation or after its
termination by death and may bar each other of all rights in the re-
spective estates not so secured to them by their agreement. This sec-
tion shall not be construed to make invalid or unenforceable any
antenuptial agreement or settlement made and executed in conform-
ity with this section because the agreement or settlement covers or in-
cludes marital property, if the agreement or settlement would be
valid and enforceable without regard to this section.
Subd. 2. Antenuptial contracts or settlements shall be in writing, exe-
cuted in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged by the par-
ties, executing the same before any officer or person authorized to
administer an oath under the laws of this state. The agreement must
be entered into and executed prior to the day of solemnization of
marriage.
Subd. 3. An antenuptial contract or settlement which by its terms
conveys or determines what rights each has in the other's real prop-
erty and sets forth the legal description of the real estate granted or
affected by the agreement may be filed or recorded in every county
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Johnson and McKee-Johnson divorced in 1987.5 The trial
court, relying on dicta in a related Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision,6 held that the antenuptial contract statute authorized
agreements dealing with non-marital property only.7 The court
further held that the statute prohibited marital property provi-
sions.8 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the
district court, although noting the statute's ambiguity.9 The
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review, eventually reversing
and remanding the case to the trial court.10 The supreme court
held that the statute applied to non-marital property only.1
The court also held, however, that the statute did not prohibit
antenuptial contracts respecting marital property.12 Such con-
tracts are enforceable under common law, provided that they
are procedurally and substantively fair both at execution and
enforcement. 3
During the past two decades, new statutes and case law re-
garding antenuptial contracts have significantly altered the
family law landscape. In addition, changing societal attitudes
where any real estate so described is situated, in the office of the
county recorder for the county or in any public office authorized to
receive a deed, assignment or other instrument affecting the real es-
tate, for filing or recording.
Subd. 4. Any antenuptial contract or settlement not recorded in the
office of the county recorder or other public office authorized to re-
ceive the document, where the real property is located, shall be void
as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration of the same real property, or any part thereof, whose
conveyance is first duly recorded, and as against any attachment lev-
ied thereon or any judgment lawfully obtained at the suit of any party
against the person in whose name the title to the property appears of
record prior to recording of the conveyance.
Subd. 5. An antenuptial contract or settlement duly acknowledged
and attested shall be prima facie proof of the matters acknowledged
therein and as to those matters, the burden of proof shall be and rest
upon the person contesting the same.
Subd. 6. This section shall apply to all antenuptial contracts and set-
tlements executed on or after August 1, 1979.
Subd. 7. Nothing in sections 519.01 to 519.101, shall be construed to af-
fect antenuptial contracts or settlements.
4. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd en banc, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
5. Id. at 690.
6. Id. at 693 (citing Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
7. Id.
8. Id
9. Id. at 693-94.
10. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 268.
11. Id. at 264, 265.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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and practices with respect to marriage, divorce, and remarriage
have increased the desirability of permitting couples to arrange
privately the incidents of a possible dissolution.14 Parties re-
quire definitive statutes and judicial rulings in order to draft
agreements on which they can rely when their marriages end.
In McKee-Johnson v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court
provided partial, but inadequate, guidance as to which matters
antenuptial contracts may cover, what law applies when an
agreement implicates both the statute and the common law,
and what standard of review courts should apply when a con-
tract's validity is litigated.
This Comment examines the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in McKee-Johnson v. Johnson and suggests an alterna-
tive analysis which courts can use to craft standards to govern
review and enforcement of antenuptial contracts. This alterna-
tive analysis incorporates the existing family law policy of
treating marriage as a partnership.1 5 Part I examines Minne-
sota's recent legislative and judicial approaches toward ante-
nuptial contracts, including the public policy considerations
underlying recent changes. Part II discusses the Minnesota
Supreme Court's reasoning and holding in McKee-Johnson.
Part III examines the supreme court's decision, particularly the
court's failure to consider the law of antenuptial contracts in
terms of the marital dissolution statute's provisions and poli-
cies. Part IV proposes legislative changes that would conform
antenuptial contract law to the theory of marital partnership
underlying present family law policy. This Comment concludes
that when properly regulated by judicial review, antenuptial
contracts further the policies underlying the marital dissolution
statute.
I. THE TREND TOWARD GENERALLY ENFORCEABLE
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
A. THE TRADITIONAL RESTRICTION OF ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACTS
Couples enter into antenuptial contracts16 prior to and in
consideration of marriage. These agreements set forth eco-
14. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 369
(1987).
15. See infra notes 133-144 and accompanying text.
16. Courts, commentators, and the general public often refer to antenup-
tial contracts as "premarital agreements."
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nomic, and occasionally personal,17 rights and duties that are
incidental to a couple's marriage and its dissolution. Such
agreements allow the parties to alter privately their statutory
and common law economic rights at the death of either partner,
or at the dissolution of the marriage.1
8
The traditional judicial posture toward antenuptial con-
tracts favored their use as an economic regulator at death but
disfavored their use at divorce. Minnesota followed this bifur-
cated approach. The probate statute19 and case law20 long per-
mitted antenuptial contracts that waived rights in a spouse's
estate. Antenuptial contracts regulating a spouse's economic
rights at the other spouse's death, "death-focused" agreements,
traditionally enjoyed favor because courts regarded them as
"conducive to the welfare of the parties and subservient to the
best purposes of the marriage relation."2 1 In some instances,
one or both parties to a marriage might perceive an obligation
to protect the rights or interests of third parties, generally chil-
dren of a previous marriage whose inheritance a subsequent
marriage might jeopardize.22 Spousal waiver of all or part of an
estate interest, or an alternate settlement of that interest,
would allow the marriage to occur without disturbing third-
party rights, thereby facilitating marital harmony.
2 3
Courts limited review of death-focused agreements to pro-
cedural considerations. Due to the fiduciary relationship be-
tween prospective spouses, 24  enforcement required full
disclosure of assets, knowledge of the rights being waived,25 ac-
cess to independent counsel,26 and adequate alternative provi-
17. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
18. Some jurisdictions recognize antenuptial contracts respecting property
settlements but not those respecting spousal maintenance. Among U.P.A.A.
jurisdictions, California and South Dakota have eliminated spousal mainte-
nance provisions in the Act. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
19. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-204 (1990).
20. E.g. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. 305, 307 (Minn. 1907). The earli-
est Minnesota case enforcing an antenuptial contract is Desnoyer v. Jordan, 7
N.W. 140 (Minn. 1880).
21. E.g. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. at 307.
22. Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Minn. 1982) (en banc).
Use of an antenuptial agreement to further charitable purposes is also legiti-
mate. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. at 312.
23. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. at 308.
24. Stanger v. Stanger, 189 N.W. 402, 403 (Minn. 1922).
25. Knowledge that the agreement protected the inheritance of children
satisfied the requirement. In re Estate of Jeurissen, 161 N.W.2d 324, 326
(Minn. 1968).
26. Although the parties did not actually need to consult independent
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sion for the party surrendering rights.27  Courts did not
measure the "adequate alternative" factor by the probate stat-
ute. Instead, courts examined the actual needs of the party sur-
rendering rights.28 Inadequate consideration, however, was
insufficient to set aside or modify the contract,29 and instead
created a rebuttable presumption of fraud.30 The person whose
property the contract protected carried the burden of establish-
ing compliance with the procedural requirements.31
Courts premised the traditional disfavor of antenuptial
contracts effective upon divorce, "divorce-focused" agreements,
on the assumption that these agreements were antithetical to
the marriage contract: husbands must support their wives and
wives must serve their husbands.32 As early as 1907, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court stated in dicta that "contracts which
tend to induce a separation of husband and wife are.., utterly
void and of no force or effect.133 Thus Minnesota was solidly
aligned with the traditional view that antenuptial contracts that
were effective at a time other than death encouraged divorce. 34
counsel, such consultation generally served to waive other procedural safe-
guards. Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d at 383, 385.
27. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. at 311-312.
28. Id.
29. Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d at 385.
30. Id-
31. Slingerland v. Slingerland, 132 N.W. 326, 328 (Minn. 1911).
32. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 342 (1981); see also
In re Ryan's Estate, 114 N.W. 820, 821 (Wis. 1908) (stating that husband and
wife cannot vary personal duties and obligations arising from marriage con-
tract itself); In re Malchow's Estate, 172 N.W. 915, 916 (Minn. 1919) (noting
that antenuptial contracts are virtually confined to estate rights upon death).
33. In re Appleby's Estate, 111 N.W. 305, 310 (Minn. 1907).
34. Minnesota case law in this area is very limited, but follows the then-
existing common law majority rule. The laws of other jurisdictions are thus a
necessary source for understanding Minnesota's judicial climate. The notion
that antenuptial agreements effective on divorce would encourage divorce is
reflected in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 586 (1932). Courts did not ac-
tually analyze this notion (and find it inadequate) until 1972 in Illinois. See
Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (stating that no evidence
suggests that antenuptial agreements encourage divorce).
Perhaps more fundamentally, courts saw divorce-focused antenuptial con-
tracts as incompatible with fault-based divorce laws which divided property
and fixed alimony on a non-contractual basis. See WEITZMAN, supra note 32, at
353. Furthermore, courts perceived them as possibly encouraging collusion be-
tween the parties, allowing one to allege without contest the grounds for di-
vorce in order to gain judicial approval of the provisions in the antenuptial
contract. See Allen v. Allen, 150 So. 237, 238 (Fla. 1933) (per curiam); Schulz
v. Fox, 345 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Mont. 1959).
In addition, courts felt that wives, as the frequently economically weaker
parties, needed the judiciary's protection from overreaching husbands. See Del
1992]
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B. THE MODERN TREND TOWARD RECOGNIZING ANTENUPTIAL
CONTRACTS
1. Common Law Changes
Beginning in the 1960s,35 the "divorce revolution," which
has greatly altered family life and the landscape of family
law,36 undermined the policy bases for disfavoring divorce-fo-
cused agreements.3 7 For example, changes in marital dissolu-
tion law from fault-based grounds to no-fault grounds such as
"irretrievable breakdown" reflected new judicial and societal
attitudes toward failed marriages.38  Rather than forcing
spouses to endure a situation intolerable to one or both of
them, the new attitude sought to discover ways to equitably dis-
solve marriages39 with as much efficiency, and as little acri-
mony, as possible.40 With only a few exceptions,41 most states
now recognize the vital role antenuptial contracts can play in
pursuing these new goals.42
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962); Murdock v. Murdock,
76 N.E. 57, 59 (Ill. 1905); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1964). See generally Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166-172 (Pa. 1990) (con-
taining a broad discussion by majority, concurring, and dissenting justices on
whether there is a continuing need to protect women's interests in marriage).
Similarly, courts feared that an antenuptial contract which deprived a wife of
alimony could lead to a husband's unbridled cruelty against his wife, because
he need not heed the economic consequences of his acts. See also Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970).
35. WEITZMAN, supra note 32, at 142-43.
36. One measure of the changes in family law is the promulgation of nu-
merous uniform acts. Among the most prominent of these acts are several
which Minnesota has adopted, including: UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT,
9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) (adopted by Minnesota at MINN. STAT. §§ 518.002-.66
(1990)); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988) (adopted
by Minnesota at MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1990)); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B
U.L.A. 287 (1987) (adopted by Minnesota at MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.74 (1990));
REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381
(1987) (adopted by Minnesota at MN. STAT. §§ 518C.01-.36 (1990)).
37. WEITZMAN, supra note 32, at 150.
38. The intent of the U.M.D.A. is to provide only no-fault grounds for dis-
solution. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 102(6), 9A U.L.A. 158 (1987).
39. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 286
N.E.2d 42, 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
40. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 102(3), (4), 9A U.L.A. 158 (1987);
see also UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147
(1987) (discussing policy reasons behind the Act).
41. Nebraska, for example, does not enforce divorce-focused antenuptial
contracts. Mulford v. Mulford, 320 N.W.2d 470, 471 (Neb. 1982).
42. Frequently the courts' new posture toward antenuptial agreements
preceded legislative adoption of a no-fault statute. See Posner, 233 So. 2d at
384 (noting that the no-fault statute in California indicates a trend in the law,
even though the Florida legislature had not enacted such a law by 1970).
[Vol. 77:441
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Changes in the law of divorce-focused antenuptial contracts
began when the courts abandoned the traditional common law
hostility to such contracts. The Minnesota Supreme Court first
recognized the validity of divorce-focused agreements in 1970.43
In Englund v. Englund, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the property settlement provisions" of an antenuptial contract
on divorce.45 The court, however, simply applied to divorce-fo-
43. Englund v. Englund, 175 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1970). In the same year,
the Florida Supreme Court, through Posner, handed down a much more influ-
ential decision. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381. In a prior case reviewing the effect of
an antenuptial agreement on the distribution of an estate, the Florida
Supreme Court had already recognized that an antenuptial agreement effec-
tive upon divorce was not necessarily void as against public policy. Del
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d. 17, 20 (Fla. 1962). The Posner court sig-
naled a new willingness to allow spouses to settle before marriage their eco-
nomic rights and obligations in the event of divorce. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385.
This court took judicial notice of the sweeping changes in the divorce laws of
other jurisdictions, id. at 384-85, and premised its new common law approach
on the new family law policies implicit in the trend toward no-fault divorce,
even though Florida had not yet adopted a no-fault divorce statute. See id. at
384 (discussing California's "irreconcilable differences" basis for marital disso-
lution). Posner established a threefold test for enforceability of antenuptial
agreements. First, an antenuptial agreement must meet a procedural require-
ment of fairness at inception. The parties must have entered the agreement
voluntarily and included a "fair and reasonable provision" for the wife or "full
and frank disclosure" of the husband's financial circumstances. I& at 385 (cit-
ing Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d at 20). Second, the parties must seek the divorce in
"good faith, on proper grounds," as evidence that the agreement itself had not
occasioned the divorce. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 385. Third, a court could review
the agreement for changed circumstances at the time of enforcement under a
generally applicable statute allowing trial courts to amend postnuptial agree-
ments as to property and alimony. Id.
44. Although the court has yet to rule on the matter of spousal mainte-
nance provisions, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has upheld them. See Hill
v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d
501, 503 (Minn. 1989) (en banc) (discussing the validity of waiver of statutory
maintenance rights in antenuptial agreements).
Other jurisdictions have split over the validity of maintenance provisions
in antenuptial contracts. Compare Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734-36
(Colo. 1982), Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1976), Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972), Osborne v. Osborne,
428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Mass. 1981), Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla.
1960), Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (Or. 1973) (all recognizing the
validity of maintenance provisions) with In re Marriage of Winegard, 278
N.W.2d 505, 512 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Winegard v. Gilvin, 444 U.S.
951 (1979) and Fricke v. Fricke 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950) (both precluding
such provisions).
45. Englund, 175 N.W.2d at 463. Like the Posner court, 233 So. 2d at 385,
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Englund required that for an antenuptial
agreement to be held valid, it must not "encourage divorce." 175 N.W.2d at
463.
The Englund court did not, however, systematically consider the policy
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cused agreements the same procedural requirements courts
used to review death-focused antenuptial contracts.46 The
supreme court did not relate enforcement of antenuptial con-
tracts to prevailing family law policies.47
2. Statutory Changes
a. Minnesota
As courts throughout the country adopted new common
law rules for antenuptial contracts, many legislatures enacted
statutory provisions48 allowing for divorce-focused agreements.
In 1974 the Minnesota legislature adopted the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (U.M.D.A.), 49 thereby providing Minne-
sota's marital dissolution statute with the first legislative
recognition of the validity of divorce-focused antenuptial
contracts.50
The U.M.D.A. property distribution provisions are based on
implications of enforcing antenuptial contracts. Similarly, the Posner court
continued to assert the priority of the state's interest in a marriage over the
interests of the parties involved. 233 So. 2d at 382-83. Furthermore, Posner's
"proper grounds" reflected a desire to prevent improper divorces. Id. at 385.
The Posner court's analysis of how antenuptial contracts effective on death
might also lead to marital disharmony shows how the attitude toward ante-
nuptial contracts remains tied to older family concepts.
Other courts, as if continuing their traditional policies, occasionally specu-
lated that in some circumstances antenuptial agreements promote marriage by
removing the risk of disastrous personal economic losses in the event that the
marriage fails. The security an antenuptial agreement affords theoretically
frees a party to marry without fear that divorce will result in a ruinous redis-
tribution of premarital property or an award of excessive spousal maintenance.
Courts have also recognized that antenuptial agreements restricted to the par-
ties' estate interests can also promote divorce. For example, a spouse facing
disinheritance or a greatly reduced share might seek a divorce in order to se-
cure a large property settlement and maintenance. See, e.g., Posner, 233 So. 2d
at 383-84. Without necessarily articulating a policy supporting the enforce-
ment of antenuptial agreements, courts now frankly admit that antenuptial
agreements never demonstrably impeded the policy of promoting marital sta-
bility. E.g. Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
46. Englund, 175 N.W.2d at 463 (citing Appleby v. Appleby, 111 N.W. 305,
310 (Minn. 1907)).
47. Id at 461.
48. One such statute is the widely adopted Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
49. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) (adopted in
Minnesota through MINN. STAT. §§ 518.002-.66 (1990)).
50. MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5)(e) (1990). Minnesota adopted the original ver-
sion of U.M.D.A. § 307 (as did Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri), but
modified it slightly. As promulgated, the U.M.D.A. recognizes any valid agree-
ment between the parties. Minnesota's version, however, does not provide for
post-nuptial agreements.
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a policy of treating marriage as a partnership.5' Thus, Minne-
sota law establishes a presumption that all property a couple
acquires during their marriage is "marital property" and sub-
ject to distribution.52 In all but short marriages, courts have
held that the statute envisions roughly equivalent shares.53
Although the U.M.D.A. Prefatory Note makes the point only
cursorily,54 the parallels between dissolution and partnership
law are clear. Absent any provision to the contrary, just as
partners share in profits equally,5 5 spouses should have an
equal claim to half of their joint property. The marital prop-
erty presumption is overcome, however, by a showing that spe-
cific property is "non-marital" and generally not subject to
distribution on dissolution. Inclusion of specific property in an
antenuptial contract is one means of making property non-
marital.56
Significantly, although the property distribution statute
provides that in the event of hardship the court can award up
to one-half of one spouse's non-marital property to the other
spouse, the hardship provision does not extend to property that
an antenuptial contract excludes from distribution.57 This ex-
clusion establishes a strong public policy in favor of the inviola-
bility of antenuptial agreements. The dissolution statute
established neither explicit procedural requirements for the ex-
ecution of antenuptial contracts nor standards for judicial re-
51. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. at 149.
52. MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (1990).
53. See, e.g., Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 195, 198 (Minn. 1987) (en
banc).
54. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 148.
55. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) (adopted in Min-
nesota through MINN. STAT. §§ 323.01-.43 (1990)).
56. MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5)(e) (1990). Other types of non-marital prop-
erty include gifts, bequests, and inheritance received by one spouse but not the
other, property owned prior to the marriage, and the increased value of both
of these types of property.
57. The statute provides:
If the court finds that either spouse's resources or property, including
the spouse's portion of the marital property as defined in MINN. STAT.
§ 518.54, subdivision 5, are so inadequate as to work an unfair hard-
ship, considering all relevant circumstances, the court may, in addi-
tion to the marital property, apportion up to one-half of the property
otherwise excluded under § 518.54, subdivision 5, clauses (a) to (d), to
prevent the unfair hardship.
MINN. STAT. § 518.58(2) (1990).
This provision deliberately omits the possibility of the court distributing
property included in an antenuptial contract:
"Nonmarital property" means property real or personal, acquired by
1992]
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view.58 Thus, common law principles continued to govern these
aspects of antenuptial contracts in their newly recognized
role.5 9
In 1979, the Minnesota legislature enacted specific provi-
sions regulating both death-focused and divorce-focused ante-
nuptial contracts. 60 The statute contains several important
features. First, it codifies common law procedural prerequisites
for making agreements valid.6 1 Second, the statute facially ap-
plies only to agreements covering property which the distribu-
tion statute had already excluded from distribution as non-
marital property, even without an antenuptial contract.62
Third, it makes no provision for substantive review.63 Fourth,
the statute contains an ambiguous provision stating that other-
wise valid contracts as to marital property would not render an
antenuptial contract as to non-marital property invalid or unen-
forceable.6 Finally, the statute does not address spousal
maintenance.65
b. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (U.P.A.A.) repre-
sents the current trend in antenuptial contract law.66 Promul-
either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage,
which
(a) is acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a
third party to one but not to the other spouse;
(b) is acquired before the marriage;
(c) is acquired in exchange for or is the increase in value of
property which is described in clauses (a), (b), (d), and (e);
(d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date; or
(e) is excluded by a valid antenuptial contract.
MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (1990).
58. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.002-.66 (containing no reference to such execu-
tion or review).
59. See, e.g., Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Minn. 1980) (en banc);
Lenzmeier v. Lenzmeier, 231 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Minn. 1975) (interpreting ante-
nuptial agreements without specific statutory guidelines).
60. MiNN. STAT. § 519.11 (1990).
61. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn. 1989) (en
banc). The statute, however, shifts onto the opponent the burden of establish-
ing procedural fairness. Id.
62. MINN. STAT. § 519.11(1) (1992).
63. See id- § 519.11.
64. See i& § 519.11(1).
65. See id, § 519.11.
66. The Prefatory Note sets forth the U.P.A.A.'s policy bases. UNIF. PRE-
MARITAL AGREEMENT AcT prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987). The drafters
noted the need for new legislation based on changing marital practices, specifi-
cally second marriages and the increasing number of two career couples. Id-
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gated in 1983, eighteen states have since adopted the Act.67 The
U.P.A.A. provides procedural guidelines, 68 an illustrative list of
the subjects properly considered in an antenuptial agreement, 69
and criteria for enforcement. 70 There is no requirement that
parties have access to independent counsel.
In terms of substantive review, the enforcement provisions
of the U.P.A.A. seek to uphold agreements as executed.71 First,
the Act assigns the burden of proof to the party opposing en-
Due to the long history of judicial disfavor, as well as the nonuniformity of
state laws, which is attributable to the piecemeal, "spasmodic" resolution of is-
sues at different times, the drafters deemed a uniform act necessary to address
problems of uncertain enforcement. I& The mobility of modem American
life exacerbates these problems. I& The U.P.A.A. was promulgated as "legis-
lation conforming to modem social policy... provid[ing] both certainty and
sufficient flexibility to accommodate different circumstances." Id-
67. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia have adopted the U.P.A.A. UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 31 (Supp. 1992).
Even in jurisdictions where the legislature has not adopted the U.P.A.A.,
courts have considered its provisions and policies in reaching their own com-
mon law decisions. See McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267
(Minn. 1989) (en banc).
68. Procedurally, the parties must enter the agreement voluntarily. UNIF.
PREMARIrAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). It is valid with-
out consideration. I& § 2, 9B U.L.A. at 372. It must be written and signed by
the parties. Id Invalid parts of an agreement are severable. Id. § 11, 9B
U.L.A. at 380. The Act explicitly gives the parties the right to choose the law
under which construction of the agreement is to occur. Id § 3(7), 9B U.L.A. at
373. The Act presumes, but does not strictly require, "fair and reasonable dis-
closure." See id. § 6(a)(2)(i), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
69. I& at § 3(a), 9B U.L.A. at 373. The most significant are rights to prop-
erty and spousal maintenance. The Act explicitly precludes any agreement be-
tween the parties that would adversely affect child support. Id- § 3(b), 9B
U.L.A. at 373.
70. Id § 6, 9B U.L.A. at 376.
71. The U.P.A.A. moves away from the strict standards of substantive re-
view adopted in some jurisdictions which permit challenges to antenuptial con-
tracts. One of the prominently employed standards which the U.P.A.A.
precludes is the consideration of a lifestyle greatly enhanced since the time of
the marriage. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 37:2-31.81 (1988); Gross v. Gross, 464
N.E.2d 500, 510 (Ohio 1984). But see Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 736
(Colo. 1982) (invalidating an agreement regardless of enhanced lifestyle).
Professor Judith Younger's representation of the U.P.A.A. as providing
for substantive fairness review at the time of execution as well as enforcement
is misleading. See Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agree-
ments, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1988). The U.P.A.A. decidedly discour-
ages such review unless there are procedural grounds for it. Further, the Act
measures unconscionability at the time of execution, not enforcement. The
public assistance exception for spousal maintenance, see infra notes 77 and
123, would be unavailable to an agreeing party concerned only with property
distribution. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a), 9B U.L.A. 376
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forcement.72 Second, the U.P.A.A. contains only two grounds
for setting aside the agreement: either failure to meet the pro-
cedural requirement of voluntariness, 73 or unconscionability 74
at the time of execution,75 coupled with the lack of knowledge
of the proponent's financial circumstances at the time of execu-
tion.7 6 Despite this opposition to substantive review at the time
of enforcement, a court, under limited circumstances, may re-
quire spousal support at a level necessary to prevent a spouse
from becoming eligible for public assistance.77
Although promulgated after Minnesota's marital dissolu-
tion and antenuptial contract statutes, the U.P.A.A. has af-
fected their judicial interpretation when the Minnesota
Supreme Court has turned to it for an indication of the direc-
(1987). Furthermore, the provision of welfare assistance levels of maintenance
is a far cry from a consideration of all of the facts of the parties' finances.
72. I Some jurisdictions place the burden of proof on the opponent of
the agreement. See, e.g., Linker v. Linker, 470 P.2d 921, 923 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970). But the burden of proof could be placed on the proponent. See Hartz v.
Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 871 (Md. 1967). Other courts automatically shift the bur-
den of proof to the proponent when the opponent presents evidence of imbal-
ance in the provisions of the agreement. See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio,
143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962); Hartz, 234 A.2d at 865.
73. UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
74. The comment to § 6 relates the definition of unconscionability to
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). Unconsciona-
bility is a commercial law doctrine, providing protection from onesidedness,
oppression, unfair surprise, overreaching, concealment of assets, and sharp
dealing. This attempt to coordinate the Uniform Laws, however, has unfortu-
nately confused rather than clarified the issue. In commercial law, unconscio-
nability applies to contracts at the time of formation rather than the time of
enforcement. Cf. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, 1A U.L.A. 15 (1989). The
U.M.D.A. and U.P.A.A. use unconscionability in the former sense. The
U.M.D.A., however, defines circumstances at execution which render the
agreement unconscionable in terms of the life of a marriage, which is
equivalent to a court analyzing unconscionability at the time of enforcement.
Hence, doctrinal confusion exists if a court finds an antenuptial agreement un-
conscionable at the time of enforcement. The Prefatory Note of the U.P.A.A.,
however, makes clear that its drafters did not intend a court to review the con-
scionability of changed circumstances at the time of enforcement. UNIF. PRE-
MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 370 (1987). Furthermore,
in adopting the U.P.A.A., two states modified § 6 to permit modification of
agreements the court finds unconscionable at the time of enforcement. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37.2-32 (West 1988).
New Jersey adds a standard of living criterion to measure unconscionability.
75. UNIT. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
76. A party can obtain this knowledge in any of three ways: fair and rea-
sonable disclosure; written waiver of disclosure; or actual knowledge. UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §§ 6(a)(2)(i)-(iii), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
77. Id. at § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
[Vol. 77:441
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
tion of antenuptial contract law.78 Nevertheless, for a decade, a
patchwork of provisions derived from two recent statutes and
new case law governed Minnesota's enforcement of antenuptial
contracts. Minnesota courts failed to reconcile these competing
and potentially contradictory provisions79 until the dissolution
of Lance Johnson and Mary McKee-Johnson's marriage.
II. CASE DESCRIPTION
In McKee-Johnson v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme
Court revisited the law of antenuptial contracts and for the
first time addressed the validity of such an agreement under
the antenuptial contract statute.80 The parties executed an an-
tenuptial contract involving both non-marital and marital prop-
erty.8' At trial, Mary McKee-Johnson contested the validity of
the agreement on both procedural8 2 and substantive 3 grounds.
The trial court resolved the procedural issues in favor of Lance
Johnson, 4 but held that the statute invalidated the provisions
dealing with marital property.85 The trial court therefore sev-
ered these disallowed marital property provisions from the rest
of the agreement, which it then enforced.8 6 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court.8 7 On further appeal, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court addressed three significant issues: the
scope of the antenuptial contract statute, the proper standard of
procedural review, and the time reference and standard of sub-
stantive review.
78. See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989)
(en banc) (relying on the U.P.A.A. for a definition of "unconscionability").
79. In reviewing antenuptial contracts executed before the 1979 statute,
Minnesota courts analyzed these contracts solely under common law princi-
ples. See Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
80. The antenuptial contract statute applies only to agreements executed
after the effective date of August 1, 1979. MINN. STAT. § 519.11(6) (1980).
Johnson and McKee-Johnson executed their agreement in 1980. McKee-John-
son, 444 N.W.2d at 262.
81. McKee-Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 261.
82. Mary McKee-Johnson alleged that she lacked independent counsel.
Id at 266. The trial court found that McKee-Johnson had voluntarily waived
her right to independent counsel, after advice to seek such. Id.
83. McKee-Johnson argued that the agreement was unconscionable due to
changed circumstances. Id. at 267.
84. Id at 266.
85. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd en banc, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989). The trial court was influ-
enced by dicta in Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (opining
that the statute prohibited antenuptial agreements as to marital property).
86. Id. at 693.
87. Id at 689.
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Characterizing it as the primary issue, the supreme court
first clarified the permissible scope of antenuptial contracts re-
specting property distribution in the event of marital dissolu-
tion.88  Although the supreme court noted the statute's
ambiguity,89 it vacated the court of appeals' decision.9 0 Review-
ing the relevant legislative history, the court concluded that the
legislature intended the statute to be neutral as to marital
property.91 The court reasoned that the statute's failure to ad-
dress marital property was not evidence that the legislature in-
tended to prohibit antenuptial contracts containing such
provisions, so long as such contracts met existing common law
and other statutory requirements.9 2 Given such compliance,
the court concluded that the statute positively recognizes the
validity of such agreements.9 3
The court next analyzed procedural and substantive stan-
dards of review for antenuptial contracts. For procedural fair-
ness, the court decided that the statute codified the existing
common law standards, 94 which required full financial disclo-
sure95 and the opportunity to consult with independent coun-
sel.96 Thus the common law understanding of procedural
fairness governed both non-marital and marital property as-
pects of antenuptial contracts, the former through the statute
and the latter through the continuing application of the com-
mon law. Although the statute placed the burden of demon-
strating procedural fairness on the opponent of an agreement,97
the court held that the inclusion of marital property in the in-
88. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 261.
89. The court noted the ambiguity of the statute, which on one hand
facially applies only to antenuptial contracts respecting non-marital property
but on the other hand provides that otherwise enforceable contracts respecting
marital property would not render an antenuptial contract invalid or unen-
forceable. Id. at 263-65.
90. Id. at 267-68.
91. Id at 264.
92. Id. (noting in particular MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5)(e) (1988)).
93. Id. at 265. In dictum, the court also recognized the validity of ante-
nuptial contracts respecting spousal maintenance. Id. at 267.
94. Id. at 263.
95. Id at 264-65. In the instant case the parties attached financial sched-
ules to the agreement. Id. at 262.
96. Id. at 264-65. The court also determined that both parties were suffi-
ciently sophisticated in financial matters to comprehend the nature of their
agreement. Id at 261. Further, the court addressed the question of whether
one attorney could adequately represent both parties to an antenuptial agree-
ment. It held that joint representation is not improper per se, provided the
opportunity to consult independent counsel exists. Id at 266.
97. MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (1990).
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stant case placed the burden on the husband-proponent, be-
cause that is where it would lie under common law.
9 8
Regarding substantive fairness, the court addressed the ap-
propriate time frame and standard for review. The court first
noted that jurisdictions disagree on the proper temporal refer-
ence for review of the substantive fairness of antenuptial con-
tracts. Some jurisdictions focus on the time of execution,
others on the time of enforcement, and still others on both.99
The court recognized that Minnesota common law previously
considered the circumstances of the parties only at the time of
execution. 00 The court, however, found "no reason" to disre-
gard changed circumstances at the time of enforcement in its
review of substantive fairness,' 0 ' persuaded apparently by a
U.P.A.A. provision' 0 2 and a court of appeals decision 0 3 which
mandated substantive review of maintenance provisions in an-
tenuptial agreements from the time of dissolution. The court
reasoned that drastically changed circumstances might so vio-
late the reasonable expectations of the parties that enforcement
would be oppressive and unconscionable. 0
4
The court acknowledged that its remand failed "to articu-
late any precise rules or guidelines to aid trial courts in making
such a review."' 05  The court, however, proposed that trial
courts test antenuptial contracts against a standard of unfore-
seeable change in circumstances. 06 One possible consideration
would be the birth of a child to the parties. 0 7 In addition, the
court cautioned trial courts not to assume that a conscionable
antenuptial contract must meet the provisions of either the pro-
bate court code or the marital dissolution statute. 08 Such a re-
quirement would have the practical effect of depriving the
parties to an antenuptial agreement of the right to enter freely
into a meaningful contract. 09 With that caveat, the supreme
98. McKee-Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 265 (citing Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 1982)).
99. Id at 266-67.
100. Id at 267.
101. Id
102. Id. at 267 n.7. The court refered to UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 6 comment, 9B U.L.A. 376-77 (1987).
103. Id. at 267 n.7. (citing Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 57 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984)).
104. Id. at 267.
105. I&
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 268 n.8.
109. Id.
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court gave trial courts broad discretion to review antenuptial
agreements on a case-by-case basis.1 10
III. ANALYSIS
In McKee-Johnson v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme
Court saved the law of antenuptial contracts from the narrow-
ing effects of the court of appeals holding,'' which had unnec-
essarily restricted the range of enforceable agreements. The
decision is still inadequate, however, for two reasons: first, the
court altered the standards of procedural and substantive re-
view without adequately discussing the basis of enforcement
and, second, the court failed to relate the new law of antenup-
tial contracts to existing Minnesota family law policies.
A. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
In McKee-Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court funda-
mentally altered the nature of judicial review in enforcing an-
tenuptial contracts." 2  Previously, Minnesota reviewed
antenuptial contracts only for procedural fairness at the time of
execution. McKee-Johnson abandoned that practice by adding a
requirement of substantive fairness at the time of enforce-
ment."3 The combined shift in both the relevant time frame
and the nature of review came without any real guidance to aid
trial courts in conducting their reviews.
The court's decision as to substantive review is inadequate
for several reasons. First, the court failed to provide a sustaina-
ble, reasoned basis for its decision. The court's decision appears
to be based on the following three factors: its interpretation of
the U.P.A.A., a court of appeals holding that courts should re-
view maintenance provisions in antenuptial contracts at the
time of enforcement, and the doctrine of unforeseeability as
grounds to modify a contract."14
The court read the enforcement provisions of the U.P.A.A.
110. Id at 267.
111. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd en banc, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
112. The supreme court's dictum regarding maintenance clauses in ante-
nuptial agreements also sent a much-needed signal that the court will enforce
such provisions, thereby allowing parties to provide their own resolution to
this matter. McKee-Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 267.
113. Id The court claimed that it traditionally reviewed premarital agree-
ments for substantive as well as procedural fairness, id. at 265, but the opinion
offers no authority for this assertion.
114. See id. at 266-68.
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to allow for substantive review at the time of enforcement.11 5
In fact, the U.P.A.A. provides for nonenforcement of property
arrangements only when the agreement was unconscionable
when executed and when disclosure was inadequate.116 Thus,
one of the main supports for the court's decision collapses. Far
from following the U.P.A.A., McKee-Johnson sets Minnesota
law on an uncertain course.117
The supreme court also relied on Hill v. Hill, a court of ap-
peals decision which held that courts should review mainte-
nance provisions in an antenuptial contract for substantive
fairness at the time of enforcement. 8 In accepting this princi-
ple, the supreme court failed to consider the fundamental dif-
ference between the dissolution statute's property distribution
and spousal maintenance provisions. Unlike property division,
maintenance is linked directly to the parties' needs and their
potential incomes.119 Thus current circumstances are especially
relevant. Furthermore, a trial court can modify maintenance in
the light of changed circumstances. 120 Because inadequacy of
support constitutes grounds for future modification,' 2 ' a court
may modify an antenuptial contract provision as to mainte-
nance when enforcement is initially sought.
Trial courts lack similar latitude to modify property alloca-
tion agreements. The property distribution statute limits a trial
court's ability to allocate property that an antenuptial contract
115. Id. at 267 n.7. Professor Judith Younger, who wrote an amicus brief
in this case at the court's request, has proffered this interpretation of the
U.P.A.A. See Younger, supra note 71, at 1082 n.122. The text of the U.P.A.A.,
however, does not support this interpretation. The court misinterpreted the
Comment to U.P.A.A. § 6, which defines "unconscionability" by reference to
U.M.D.A. § 306. See UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 comment, 9B
U.L.A. 376 (1987). Unconscionability in the U.M.D.A. refers to separation
agreements, rather than antenuptial contracts. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 306, 9B U.L.A. 216 (1987). Unlike the case of an antenuptial agreement
activated by a divorce, the time frame of a dissolution agreement is simultane-
ously that of the execution of the agreement and the termination of the
marriage.
116. UNIF. PREmRITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
117. The court acknowledged that its decision ran counter to the general
state of the law of antenuptial contracts. McKee-Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 267
("Many jurisdictions, perhaps a majority, have opted for a time of execution
review, prompted, undoubtedly, by concerns relative to freedom of contract
between consenting adults.").
118. Id. at 267 n.7 (citing Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
119. MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1991).
120. Id
121. Id.
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specifically protects.1 22 A trial court also has jurisdiction over
property distribution. The policy behind this distinction be-
tween maintenance and property distribution recognizes that
individuals often use antenuptial agreements to protect the in-
terests of third parties. If courts set aside or modify property
provisions, they could negatively affect those interests the par-
ties to the antenuptial contract sought to protect. Furthermore,
the legislature has statutorily deprived courts of the right to al-
ter the property provisions of procedurally fair antenuptial con-
tracts, but has not enacted similar legislation with respect to
maintenance. Thus, courts should distinguish review of main-
tenance provisions from review of property settlements. 12
3
A second inadequacy of the McKee-Johnson decision is the
court's refusal to establish a stable standard of review. The
court excused itself from the task of providing real guidance,
urging trial courts to balance the values of freedom of contract
and fairness.124 The court did mention unforeseeably changed
circumstances as relevant to determining conscionability and
fairness.125 The nature of the marriage relationship, however,
is inherently one of changing circumstances. This standard of
review, therefore, is particularly inappropriate as applied to an-
tenuptial contracts.
The court's one explicit criterion for unforseeability is the
birth of children.126 This occurrence, however, is so common-
place as to make the court's test for unforeseeability meaning-
122. See MINN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (1990).
123. The U.P.A.A. reflects the distinction between maintenance and prop-
erty settlements. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A.
376 (1987). Although a general challenge to a premarital agreement is virtu-
ally impossible, the U.P.A.A. allows amendment at the time of enforcement of
an antenuptial contract modifying or waiving spousal maintenance when the
party contesting the agreement is made eligible for public assistance by its pro-
visions. Id. But even then, court-ordered modification of the agreement is
limited to providing sufficient support to make the party ineligible for public
assistance. Id.
Upon adopting the U.P.A.A., California and South Dakota eliminated the
right to waive or modify spousal maintenance provisions. 9B U.L.A. 374 (1987)
(California modification); 9B U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1992) (South Dakota modifica-
tion). Texas allows such agreements but has eliminated the provision for
court-ordered modification based on inadequacy of support. 9B U.L.A. 34
(Supp. 1992).
124. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267-68 (Minn. 1989) (en
banc).
125. Id. at 267.
126. Id As a rule, the parties cannot bargain away the interests of their
children in an antenuptial agreement. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 3(b), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
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less and invites unbridled judicial discretionary review of
antenuptial contracts. For most couples the possibilities of hav-
ing children or not having children are both within the range of
genuinely foreseeable circumstances. Analogizing to business
associations, when owners of shares in closely held corporations
in good faith seek to protect their interests through an agree-
ment, they can reasonably foresee both tremendous growth and
the total collapse of the business. Future spouses who waive
their interests in such financial matters can also foresee the
possibility of great prosperity and complete failure. These
changes should not provide the basis for undoing the parties'
reliance when, as here, the legislature has articulated a policy
of protecting these interests from judicial interference. 2 7
The inadequate guidance of the McKee-Johnson decision
will have two major negative consequences. First, attorneys
and their clients will lack assurance that they are drafting and
executing antenuptial contracts that will withstand a future
challenge. Uncertainty and confusion will almost inevitably re-
sult. Second, because abuse of discretion will presumably be
the standard of appellate review,2s inconsistency among trial
courts may result.
Finally, substantive review at the time of enforcement un-
.dermines the ability of parties to rely on their contracts by in-
troducing the potential for instability in the law. 29 Stability is
essential if people are to order their affairs today with any con-
fidence that their legitimate contracts will be enforced in the
future. This is especially true when people make major life de-
cisions, such as whether to marry. It is essential to bear in
mind that when a court reviews an antenuptial contract, the
very existence of the parties' marriage is predicated on their
willingness to execute the agreement. 30 Parties who otherwise
would not marry without the protections of an antenuptial
agreement should not have their reliance undone by a court
that lacks guidelines. Neither should courts force parties to lit-
127. See MINN. STAT. § 518.54(e) (1990).
128. See McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd en banc, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
129. The policy of stare decisis also militates against review at the time of
enforcement. Minnesota courts have traditionally focused substantive review
only on the time of execution. Courts maintained this standard even when the
law restricted antenuptial contracts to estate rights. The supreme court
should not justify altering established legal norms by simply asking "why
not?"
130. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing unconscionability
in the U.C.C.).
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igate an agreement they reasonably believed had been settled
and which formed the basis of later personal and economic ar-
rangements. Fairness requires courts to protect the parties'
reasonable reliance on a voluntarily undertaken obligation or
waiver. The supreme court's test, balancing freedom of con-
tract and fairness, invites broad judicial discretion which can
only work against the policy of allowing the parties the free-
dom to settle their own affairs.
B. ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS AND FAMILY LAw POLICIES
Perhaps even more significant than the particular
problems of substantive review at the time of enforcement is
the McKee-Johnson court's failure to discuss the policy basis of
the new law of antenuptial contracts. The decision com-
promises existing state policies in several ways. First, review
for fairness at the time of enforcement will decrease efficiency
and increase acrimony in the dissolution process, thus defeating
two principal policies underlying both the dissolution and ante-
nuptial contract statutes.131 The dissolution process is made
more efficient by the antenuptial contract statute's provision
that the agreement is prima facie evidence of the matters con-
tained therein.132 Substantive review at trial will mitigate this
provision's effect by requiring an investigation of the parties'
original expectations, evidence of which will depend primarily
on memories dimmed by the passage of time and clouded by the
bitterness of the dissolution itself. Quite naturally, self-interest
and selectivity will guide the parties' understanding of what
rights they waived and those they retained. New opportunities
for review and modification will result in increased litigation.
Second, fairness review at the time of enforcement runs
counter to the marriage as partnership policy which underlies
Minnesota's dissolution statute' 33 and case law.134 Rational
family law jurisprudence should integrate the policy bases of
131. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 147-49
(1987).
132. MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (1990).
133. "The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage
should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident
to the dissolution of a partnership." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT pref-
atory note, 9A U.L.A. 149 (1987). The Act is codified in Minnesota at MINN.
STAT. §§ 518.002-.66.
134. See, e.g., Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987) (adopt-
ing the position that the increase in the value of a business during the mar-
riage is the product of the contributions of both spouses and therefore belongs
to the marital partnership).
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the various laws governing marriage. Because the dissolution
statute both relies on partnership law as its rationale and recog-
nizes the vital role of antenuptial agreements, the law gov-
erning antenuptial contracts should reflect partnership
principles unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.
Like family law, partnership law involves the nexus of
statutes, common law, and private contracts. Indeed, the Uni-
form Partnership Act (U.P.A.) 135 provides a useful analogy for
marriage and dissolution law. In partnership law, the statute is
a "gap filler," adequate for the needs of many partnerships.
Yet the parties are free to alter their statutory rights and obli-
gations toward each other, but not toward third parties, 36 with-
out judicial interference. For example, profits need not be split
evenly.137 If marriage is also a partnership, a rational policy
must allow the parties to arrange their own affairs, preserving
their individual economic interests as they desire.
More basically, partnership law provides a realistic analogy
to marriage. 138 Both in partnerships and in marriages the par-
ties form a fiduciary relationship. 3 9 Alhough they may enter
their relationship equipped with different assets and abilities,
parties are expected to expend their efforts on their joint enter-
prise. The state can dissolve both partnerships and marriages
without allocation of fault.140 Partnership law provides a holis-
135. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1969). Minnesota has adopted a
similar partnership act which is codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 323.01-.43 (1990).
136. The Uniform Partnership Act provides that partners may agree be-
tween themselves to any distribution of assets they see fit, but they cannot al-
ter the priority of third party creditors. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b), 6
U.L.A. 469 (1969). Similarly, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides
that although the parties may determine their individual rights, they cannot
adversely affect a child's right to support. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 3(b), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
137. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969). The U.P.A.
makes specific allowance for partners to alter the Act's default provision for
an equal distribution of profits.
138. Older common law specifically rejected this analogy. See WEITZMAN,
supra note 32, at 342. Courts and commentators have consistently overlooked
the possibility of viewing antenuptial contracts in terms of new analogies.
Even the U.P.A.A. fails to expand its policy basis to include the partnership
law analogy discussed in the U.M.D.A. The U.P.A.A. explicitly aligns itself
with the U.M.D.A. in several contexts. See UNiF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 6 comment, 9B U.L.A. 376-77 (1987) (explaining that the test of uncon-
scionability under the U.P.A.A. is derived from § 306 of the U.M.D.A.) Given
the nexus between the two acts, it seems logical that the U.P.A.A. would adopt
the U.M.D.A.'s partnership analogy.
139. See UNIF. PARTNERSHiP ACT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969) (establishing fi-
duciary duties between partners).
140. Compare UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31, 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969) (detailing
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tic and positive policy basis for contemporary marriage.141 Be-
yond strict legal considerations, the idea of marriage as a
partnership comports well with the understanding and expecta-
tions of most people entering marriages today.
In terms of property distribution upon dissolution, both
Minnesota's partnership laws and marriage laws presume equal
sharing.14 2 In business partnerships, the parties are free to de-
cide otherwise and courts will enforce an agreement executed
before the partnership's formation.143 Until McKee-Johnson,
Minnesota's marriage dissolution law appeared to allow parties
the same freedom: courts could not distribute property pro-
tected by a procedurally valid antenuptial agreement. 144 The
institution of fairness review at the time of enforcement upsets
this otherwise stable practice, introduces uncertainty, and un-
dermines the partnership policy basis of contemporary
marriage.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The Minnesota legislature should clarify the muddied law
of antenuptial contract enforcement. At the simplest level the
legislature could amend the antenuptial contract statute' 45 to
establish explicitly the time reference and standards of re-
view.146 The legislature should indicate that the time frame for
causes for the dissolution of a partnership) with UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DI.
VORCE AcT § 301, 9A U.L.A. 179 (1987) (explaining that marriage dissolution
or legal separation is not an award to one party, but rather an alteration of a
legal relationship).
141. As with most analogies, the similarities between partnership law and
marriage law has limitations. For example, personal interests are implicit in
marriage, marriage may create continuing obligations to children as third par-
ties, and fault-based rights in partnership dissolution still exist. More funda-
mentally, the terms of business partnerships should not govern basic familial
relationships.
142. For distribution of partnership assets, see UNIP. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 18(1), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969). For equal distribution of marital property, see
Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 195 (Minn. 1987) (trial court rightly di-
vided a family business into equal shares).
143. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); see supra note 137
and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
145. MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (1990).
146. The legislature should also amend the statute to recognize explicitly
the right to waive or to modify spousal maintenance in an antenuptial agree-
ment. Such a provision might be worded as follows:
Antenuptial contracts which determine the rights of the parties to
spousal maintenance under MINN. STAT. § 514.552 are enforceable,
provided that if a party becomes eligible to receive public assistance
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fairness review is that of execution, and therefore maintain the
stringent procedural safeguards now in effect. Such an amend-
ment might read as follows:
An antenuptial contract which complies with the procedural require-
ments set forth herein shall be enforceable to the extent that it was
not unconscionable when executed.
This amendment would offer several advantages. It would
make the law of antenuptial contracts consistent with the poli-
cies underlying the present marital dissolution statute. A stan-
dard which reviews antenuptial contracts for unconscionability
only at the time of execution reduces the incentive to litigate.
This in turn effectuates the policies of increasing efficiency and
discouraging public acrimony. Such an amendment would also
restore the policy in favor of protecting antenuptial contracts
from trial court discretion in property distribution.
By explicitly endorsing limited review, the legislature will
provide greater protection for many people entering antenup-
tial agreements. Substantive review of antenuptial contracts at
the time of enforcement will discourage people from marrying.
To the extent that those people will nevertheless cohabit for a
long period of time, without marriage's legal protections, one
party might suffer serious economic harm when the relation-
ship ends by death or a parting of ways. Ultimately, the court's
desire to protect spousal interests may cause some people to act
in ways outside the courts' purview.
As an alternative and more sweeping reform, the legisla-
ture could adopt the U.P.A.A. to replace Minnesota's current
statute. This alternative would more clearly align Minnesota
with the current general direction of the law of antenuptial
contracts and allow Minnesota law to evolve in conjunction
with other jurisdictions. This would increase the likelihood
that Minnesota couples could execute agreements that would
be valid in other states and it would simplify the enforcement
in Minnesota of antenuptial agreements entered into else-
where. Because the U.P.A.A.'s provisions are consistent with
Minnesota's established family law policies of increasing effi-
ciency, decreasing acrimony, and regarding marriage as a part-
nership, a coherent law of antenuptial contracts would result.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, American society has undergone a dra-
by operation of such a determination, the court may modify the con-
tract to the extent necessary to avoid such eligibility.
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matic change in patterns of marriage and divorce. Additionally,
in a growing number of marriages, both parties have significant
independent economic interests. Following the direction of the
law throughout the United States, the trend of Minnesota stat-
utory and common law over the past two decades was toward
allowing couples to make reasonable preparations to preserve
their economic interests in the event of divorce. In McKee-
Johnson v. Johnson the Minnesota Supreme Court partially re-
versed this trend. The court issued a vague decision which up-
set the current law, but did not provide trial courts with
adequate guidance for future decisions. This Comment pro-
poses that the legislature correct both the court's misreading of
the antenuptial agreement statute and its unwarranted altera-
tions of the common law. The legislature must facilitate adop-
tion of a coherent partnership-based policy for marital law.
This policy more accurately reflects contemporary attitudes and
behavior, and better serves as a basis for future developments
in the law and family life.
